The Institute of Medicine has recently endorsed arguments put forward by John Appleby calling for mandatory sex selection against female offspring in the initial trials of mitochondrial replacement techniques. In this paper I argue that, despite this endorsement, the reasons offered by Appleby for mandatory sex selection are inadequate. I further argue that plausible revisions to Appleby's arguments still fail to convincingly defend such an intrusive policy. While I remain neutral about whether intending parents making use of mitochondrial replacement techniques ought to have access to sex selection, I
| I NTR OD U CTI ON
In a historic first, the U.K. has recently approved two mitochondrial replacement procedures, namely maternal spindle transfer and pronuclear transfer, for preventing the transmission of mitochondrial disease from affected women to their offspring. 1 In the U.S.A., the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 2 has recently released a report calling for more research into these mitochondrial replacement techniques (MRT) in order to assess their clinical potential. 3 While there is optimism both in the U.K. and in the U.S.A. that mitochondrial replacement will prove to be a useful tool for preventing the transmission of mitochondrial disease, questions remain about its long-term safety. Consequently, there has been much discussion about what precautions should be in place for the first human trials, especially when it comes to measures intended to protect the welfare of future generations.
Part of what makes developing appropriate safety protocols challenging in the case of mitochondrial replacement is that mitochondrial DNA is heritable, and thus downstream health effects beyond the patient, donor, and subsequent child need to be taken into account.
Given that mitochondrial DNA follows a strict maternal inheritance pattern, 4 the IOM in the U.S.A. has recommended that sex selection be mandatory in the initial trials of the procedures so that only male offspring are created. 5 Doing so would prevent the transmission of any mitochondria-linked complications to future generations. Once the health of the initial cohort of male offspring is assessed, the scientific community could then determine whether the procedures are safe enough to make available without the sex-based restriction. In defence of this policy, the IOM cites corroborating arguments put forward by John Appleby, and it is these arguments that will be the primary subject of this paper. The Institute of Medicine has subsequently been renamed the National Academy of Medicine. and on the basis of their findings to determine whether regulations governing mitochondrial replacement techniques ought to be amended. 7 Given that we currently lack a widely accepted framework for conducting risk/benefit assessments when evaluating procedures that may carry health risks for future generations, neither the IOM nor the HFEA take an approach that contravenes some well-established norm. Nevertheless, I will argue that Appleby's line of argument, cited by the IOM in support of mandated sex selection, is flawed.
As in many debates about reproductive ethics, concerns about non-identity arise when assessing whether future people could in fact be harmed by mitochondrial replacement. Though some have argued that the relevance of the non-identity problem differs between the two approved techniques, 8 the justification for sex selection is that it would prevent harm to offspring in generations further downstream than those initially created using the techniques. Consequently, the non-identity problem remains relevant regardless of the method of mitochondrial replacement employed.
In order to avoid wading into a detailed discussion of the nonidentity problem, my strategy will be to proceed under the assumption that we can cogently talk about harm done to future generations even if the individuals created are not numerically identical to those that would exist in the absence of mitochondrial replacement. I take this as a more stringent approach to addressing the arguments put forward by Appleby, as he seems to proceed with this assumption in mind. Otherwise put, by making this assumption I will be addressing Appleby's argument on his own terms with respect to non-identity concerns. However, those who think that the non-identity problem constrains how we apply the concept of harm to future people may think that mandatory sex selection can- Let us consider more closely Appleby's claim that mandatory sex selection would not result in harm to intending parents. On this subject he states, 'considering how few prospective parents would likely be granted clinical access to MRTs (the chances are that it would be <10 cases each year), it is hard to imagine how bringing only males into existence would. . .cause suffering to the prospective parents.' 18 Put more generally, Appleby's view seems to be that a policy that imposes burdens on members of some group X cannot be said to cause harm to members of X, if X is small. The glaring problem here is that Appleby assesses the potential for harm to prospective parents solely by considering the number of individuals affected rather than the nature of the burdens that such a policy might produce. This is an ethical approach that, upon slight reflection, could license all manner of serious injusti- The IOM lists the potential for haplotype incompatibility as an additional reason for sex selection. However, Appleby notes that it remains unclear whether mitochondrial replacement results in a risk of haplotype incompatibility that is greater than in any other form of human reproduction. Appleby, op. cit. note 12, p. 509. Appleby does not appeal to haplotype incompatibility in his argument for mandatory sex selection.
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Ibid. note 9, p. 510. 17 Baylis, F. (2013) . The ethics of creating children with three genetic parents. Reproductive Biomedicine Online, 26(6), 531-534. 18 In the U.K., pathological mutations in mitochondrial DNA occur at a rate of 2.9 per 100,000 individuals: see Gorman, G. S., Schaefer, A. M., Ng, Y., Gomez, N., Blakely, E. L., Alston, C. L., . . . Taylor, R. W. (2015) . Prevalence of nuclear and mitochondrial DNA mutations related to adult mitochondrial disease. Annals of neurology, 77(5), 753-759. Also note that only female carriers risk transmitting the disease, and that some would employ donor gametes, adopt, or forgo reproducing. from reproducing with their own gametes in all circumstances, but think that enforcing a policy of this kind would be politically, ethically, and pragmatically untenable. After all, such a prohibition would, among other things, require a mechanism for preventing individuals from engaging in unassisted reproduction using their own gametes. Furthermore, one could also recognize that some individuals are committed to having genetically related offspring to such an extent that they will continue to attempt to do so even if their own previous attempts exemplify the consequences of producing children with severe mitochondrial disease.
22 Because these individuals cannot be prevented from reproducing in a risky manner, one might conclude that the best way to minimize harm is to permit such individuals' participation in trials of mitochondrial replacement while also enforcing a policy of mandatory sex selection. Doing so would at least reduce the risk of creating offspring with mitochondrial disease, and eliminate the possibility of its re-emergence in future generations. Call this the pragmatic harm reduction argument.
The pragmatic harm reduction argument rests on the key premise that trials into mitochondrial replacement procedures are likely to leave the immediate offspring and future generations better off, or at least no worse off, than if the trials were not conducted. Appleby's assessment of the possible risks to offspring following use of the approved procedures supports the plausibility of this premise. While some have argued that novel negative health outcomes may arise as a consequence of incompatibility between donor mitochondria and the nuclear DNA of the developing zygote, Appleby notes that it is unclear whether such risks are any greater following mitochondrial replacement than in other forms of human reproduction. 23 The concern that Appleby offers as justification for mandatory sex selection is that mitochondrial replacement therapies might not be completely effective at eliminating all of the pathological mitochondria from affected ova. Consequently, there is risk that offspring might harbour small amounts of pathological mitochondrial DNA. Even if this remnant pathological mitochondrial DNA does not result in mitochondrial disease in the immediate offspring, it is possible that mitochondrial disease may reemerge in generations further downstream -a possibility that is supported by animal models. 24 A policy of mandatory sex selection against female offspring while such risks are being assessed would prevent the possibility of the downstream re-emergence of mitochondrial disease.
At first blush, recasting Appleby's proposal as a pragmatic means for minimizing harm to offspring may seem to provide solid footing for mandatory sex selection. Current research suggests that participants in the trial are much less likely to have offspring with mitochondrial disease, and sex selection will prevent mitochondrial disease from occurring in future generations in cases where the procedure does not expunge all pathological mitochondrial DNA. However, even this modified version of Appleby's argument cannot justify mandating sex selection for all potential trial participants. In order to see why, imagine a carrier of mitochondrial disease who is both intent on creating a genetically related child and who would be a perfect candidate for the trial, but for her staunch objection to sex selection. Note that such an objection might not stem from a strict preference for having a female child, which we might find morally suspect. Instead, the individual might simply object to having the sex of her child 'artificially' determined, or may object to a practice that she thinks contributes to and/or normalizes morally suspect non-medical sex selection. 25 Excluding this individual from the trial will not result in a reduction of overall harm, and may mitochondrial disease to future generations is to forgo reproducing with their own gametes, even when sex selection is taken into consideration. One could thus similarly argue that while permitting trials into mitochondrial replacement might reduce harm in certain instances by providing a less risky option for those carriers determined to reproduce using their own gametes, it may also encourage individuals who would have otherwise opted to become parents without using their own gametes, or perhaps even forgone parenthood altogether, to partake in the trials despite the greater risks this poses to potential offspring. In the absence of empirical evidence to settle the question, an appeal to the risky choice objection cannot warrant mandatory sex selection without also bringing into question the permissibility trials into mitochondrial replacement techniques.
| Balancing of interests argument
A second way one might defend Appleby's policy recommendation is to forgo his controversial account of harm and accept that carriers of mitochondrial disease can be harmed by having their reproductive That a policy of mandatory sex selection correctly balances these competing interests would of course not be uncontroversial. Those who place little normative weight on the preference for rearing genetically related offspring, 26 endorse an account of reproductive autonomy that is narrow in scope, 27 or place more weight on the interests of offspring than on those of intending parents 28 might reject the permissibility of trials into mitochondrial replacement given the risks.
Conversely, those who are convinced by non-identity type arguments, 29 endorse an expansive account of reproductive autonomy, or think that current research demonstrates that mitochondrial replacement is safe (enough) might find mandatory sex selection indefensible, even when restricted to the initial cohort. However, apart from disagreement about how to properly balance the competing concerns of intending parents and future offspring, there is an additional and more theoretical reason to be suspicious that this approach could justify mandatory sex selection. As will be explained in what follows, this justification for mandatory sex selection restricts reproductive autonomy on the grounds that the offspring of trial participants may choose to reproduce in a risky manner. Given that all reproduction results in offspring who may themselves reproduce in a risky manner, the argument in its present form does not justify mandatory sex selection.
As a reminder, the goal of mitochondrial replacement is to replace all of an ovum's native mitochondria with healthy donor mitochondria.
However, the process is not perfect, and small amounts of pathological mitochondrial DNA variants may become incorporated into the result- MRT will be encouraged to inform female offspring created using the techniques about the circumstances of their conception so that they can make informed decisions about reproducing later in life.
32 Consequently, first-generation female offspring would in all likelihood be aware that they risked transmitting mitochondrial disease to their offspring. Such awareness would be most acute in cases where offspring develop mitochondrial disease prior to reaching reproductive age, if mitochondrial replacement proves to be ineffective in some cases.
However, even in cases where female offspring develop late-onset mitochondrial disease or are asymptomatic carriers, we can still expect that first-generation female offspring will be aware that they may risk transmitting mitochondrial disease. Most optimistically, follow-up tests might be able to quantify the risk of transmission in particular individuals. But even in the absence of individualized risk assessments, the follow-up will alert first-generation offspring to the fact that they may have inherited pathological mitochondrial DNA. Risk-avoidance measures, such as using mitochondrial replacement (assuming the procedure is found to be effective) or donor ova could be employed by female offspring who choose to reproduce.
The purpose of sex selection is to eliminate the possibility of creating individuals who might opt to reproduce without taking measures to reduce the likelihood of transmitting mitochondrial disease. Otherwise put, it is a policy that restricts the reproductive autonomy of a class of individuals on the grounds that their offspring may fail to take appropriate precautions if they choose to reproduce. This is a weak ground for such an intrusive policy. For one, in all cases of reproduction there is a risk that one's offspring may reproduce in a manner that is likely to cause harm to their offspring. Progenitors generally do not have the ability to prevent their offspring from exposing themselves to mutagens or teratogens prior to conceiving or while gestating, nor can they generally prevent their offspring from reproducing while suffering from severe infectious diseases that could be transmitted to their offspring.
If procreators had a duty to reproduce in a manner that ensures their offspring do not make risky reproductive decisions, procreators would be required to exercise much more control over their adult offspring than is currently considered acceptable, or else only create infertile offspring. At a minimum, in order to show that harm to future individuals outweighs reproductive autonomy in the case of mitochondrial replacement trials, proponents of mandatory sex selection would have to show that the risk to future offspring posed by allowing female offspring to be created as part of the trial is likely to be significantly greater than the likelihood of risky reproduction that is currently accepted.
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A possible response may be that there is some important difference between the risks posed by pathological genetic material and other sources of reproductive harm. For instance, we might point to the fact that genetically inheritable sources of harm are generally more transgenerationally persistent than other kinds of inheritable harm, or that the harms they pose are unique in the extent to which they are difficult to avoid. While much can be said about the normative importance of different kinds of inheritable risk factors, one reason to be suspicious of the claim that the risks posed by trials into mitochondrial replacement justify a restriction as severe and demanding as statemandated sex selection is that similar restrictions are not imposed in other cases where there is a risk of transmitting genetic abnormalities.
Consider an individual who is intent on reproducing and is a carrier of a severe recessive genetic disorder, such as beta-thalassemia. That individual can avoid creating a child who will suffer from the disease in at least three permissible ways: using donor gametes in place of his/her own, not reproducing with an individual who is also a carrier of the disease, or reproducing with a carrier but using in vitro fertilization (IVF) and pre-implementation diagnosis (PGD) in order to select against homozygous offspring who will suffer from the disease. Though someone may argue that reproducers have an obligation to refrain from creating offspring who would have to go to great lengths to reproduce in a manner that does not pose great risk to their offspring, as will be discussed below, in other cases of genetic disease we do not normally impose this requirement on intending parents.
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IVF and PGD could be used to screen out symptomatic carriers (heterogeneous carriers), though this is not required in either the US or the UK. As note below, this may not even be permissible in the UK. Given that it is permissible for those with mitochondrial disease to reproduce, trials into mitochondrial replacement are more like trials into vaccine A than they are like trials into vaccine B. Endorsing mandated sex selection would thus mean endorsing the placement of greater restrictions on the trail participants who are taking steps to avoid transmitting mitochondrial disease than on those who choose to eschew any harm-reduction measures.
If, however, the procedure leads to new sex-linked transmissible risks that are greater than those present in non-controversial forms of reproduction then there may be a case for imposing sex selection. While haplotype incompatibility is a possible contender highlighted by the IOM, as noted previously there is evidence that MRT will not put offspring at greater risk of serious health consequences arising from incompatibility between mitochondrial DNA and nuclear DNA.
The IOM also lists epigenetic effects and as yet unforeseen complications as risks to take into consideration. However, both could affect the nuclear genome in addition to the mitochondrial genome and so could be transmissible via either sex.
37 Appeals to these potential worries thus do not serve as a justification for sex selection.
| CON CL U S I ON
While this paper focuses on the regulation of mitochondrial replacement techniques, the lessons learned can be generalized to other similar cases. Recall that a major problem with Appleby's argument is that he thinks that it is 'hard to imagine' how prospective parents could be severely adversely impacted by a policy mandating sex selection on the grounds that only a few individuals would be affected by the policy. Apart from resting on a view of harm that is implausible, when taken in concert with the view that we ought to minimize overall harm, this approach undermines the permissibility of trials into mitochondrial donation. This is because if we do not have to take into consideration the adverse impact on would-be reproducers, it is unclear why, at least at the theoretical level, it would not be preferable to simply prohibit those who risk transmitting diseases from reproducing with their own gametes. What this discussion shows is that when determining how to regulate interventions directed at preventing the transmission of diseases from intending parents to generations downstream, we cannot simply appeal to the interests of future children.
Once we acknowledge that the debate requires more nuance, matters quickly become murky, as exemplified in the discussion of Questions about where the limits of medically justifiable sex selection lie, or whether reproducers ever have a duty to make use of it, while pressing, lie outside the scope of this paper.
